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 
Abstract— The reported study compares groups of 120 
participants each, from the United States, Taiwan, and Turkey 
interacting with versions of an automated path planner that vary 
in transparency and degree of automation.  The nationalities were 
selected in accordance with the theory of Cultural Syndromes as 
representatives of Dignity (US), Face (Taiwan), and Honor 
(Turkey) cultures and were predicted to differ in readiness to trust 
automation, degree of transparency required to use automation, 
and willingness to use systems with high degrees of automation.  
Three experimental conditions were tested.  In the first, highlight, 
path conflicts were highlighted leaving rerouting to the 
participant.  In the second, re-planner made requests for 
permission to reroute when a path conflict was detected.  The third 
combined condition increased transparency of the re-planner by 
combining highlighting with rerouting to make the conflict on 
which decision was based visible to the user.  A novel framework 
relating transparency, stages of automation, and trust in 
automation is proposed in which transparency plays a primary 
role in decisions to use automation but is supplemented by trust 
where there is insufficient information otherwise. Hypothesized 
cultural effects and framework predictions were confirmed. 
 
Index Terms—cultural differences, degree of automation, 
automation transparency, trust in automation 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 
S the global spread of technological innovation increases, 
it is necessary to study the factors that determine the ways in 
which users in different cultures adopt and use technology.   It 
is particularly important that products such as advanced 
automation designed by and for use within one country and 
culture be also usable in other countries and cultures.  This 
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challenge involves many different facets of automation and in 
particular factors that affect the choice to use automation. This 
study investigates the influences of transparency and degree of 
automation as mediated by culture on the decision to use 
automation. Section II introduces the theory of Cultural 
Syndromes, represented in this study by U.S., Taiwan, and 
Turkey, and advances hypotheses about the role these 
syndromes might play in the decision to use automation.  
Section III presents a unifying framework for predicting the 
effects of transparency, trust, degree of automation (DOA), on 
one another and the decision to use automation.  Section IV 
presents the simulation environment and experimental design.  
Results are presented in Section V followed by discussion in 
Section VI and conclusion in Section VII. 
II. CULTURE AND AUTOMATION 
Culture has been defined as the unique nature of a social 
group with regards to values, beliefs, norms, and practices [1]. 
Cultures can have a central theme or syndrome, which is a 
compilation of shared beliefs and practices. The majority of 
cross-cultural research has relied on the cultural themes of 
individualism and collectivism as well as Hofstede’s cultural 
dimensions [2] which focus on values.   While these constructs 
are useful for predicting and explaining attitudes and social 
organization they do not directly predict behavior.  Recent 
research focusing on norms (typical patterns of behavior) found 
in Honor, Face, and Dignity cultures provides a more direct and 
predictive framework for how people interact, form 
relationships and handle conflicts [3].   To study cross cultural 
effects of trust in automation we have collected data from three 
countries, United States (US), Taiwan (TW), and Turkey (TK), 
representative of the three cultural syndromes and varying 
significantly from one another on  Hofstede’s dimensions of 
power distance, uncertainty avoidance, and individualism as 
measured by CVScale [4].  Because no validated measure of 
individual adherence to cultural syndromes was available at the 
time of this study our comparisons are based on intact groups 
and cannot exclude differences between college populations in 
the U.S., Taiwan, and Turkey unrelated to their national 
cultures.  These differences could include possible differences 
in computer skills and experience with automated systems or 
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differences between academic disciplines Information Science 
(US) and Business (TW, TK). 
A. Cultural Syndromes 
Cultural syndromes encompass cultures of Dignity, Honor, 
and Face, which contrast with respect to the meaning and 
importance that are given to norms of exchange, reciprocity, 
punishment, honesty, and trustworthiness.  
In Dignity cultures, prevalent in Western Europe and North 
America, one’s self-worth is derived internally. It is only 
evaluated by the individual’s own standards [5]. Dignity 
cultures are high on individualism and low on power distance. 
The context that surrounds interactions is egalitarian, consisting 
of autonomous individuals who focus on personal, individual 
goals, supported by an effective system of law that enforces 
contracts and rights [5]. In these cultures, people generally have 
a “swift trust” assumption: others deserve to be trusted until 
they prove otherwise. These characteristics would lead to the 
belief that operators from Dignity cultures will be quick to trust 
in automation. 
Face cultures are prevalent in East Asian societies where 
one’s self-worth is derived externally. Self-worth is the view 
that others have of the individual and is based on social 
interactions with others. It is stable so long as the social 
hierarchy in which the person interacts is stable [5]. So, self-
worth is interdependent with a person’s role in a stable social 
hierarchy, and on fulfillment of role obligations. In these 
cultures, people can lose face if others disapprove of their 
actions and behaviors [5]. Face cultures are high in collectivism 
and high in power distance. People interact in stable hierarchies, 
and social interactions are governed by norms imposed by 
social institutions, such as religion, family, community or the 
state. People’s conformity to those norms is monitored and if 
necessary, managed by institutional sanctioning. Because of 
this institutional monitoring and sanctioning, people can engage 
in smooth social interactions in the absence of trust [6].  
Honor Cultures can be found in the Middle East, Latin 
America, and Mediterranean countries. People’s self-worth is 
dependent on interactions with others and one’s perception of 
self. Honor cultures are in the middle range on Hofstede’s 
dimensions of collectivism and power distance. In these 
cultures, honor, linked to self-worth, must be claimed as well as 
paid to others [5].  Honor cultures manifest with a reputation 
for toughness in protecting the self and family and involve not 
letting others take advantage of you [7]. The social context of 
Honor cultures is unstable social hierarchies. Consequently, 
members of an Honor culture tend to have slow trust (low trust 
at the beginning of interactions) and low trust in laws and 
institutions.  
Our hypotheses derived from this theory are: 
H1: Individuals from dignity cultures (e.g., United States) will 
have a higher level of dispositional trust due to safety 
guarantees afforded by rule of law, whereas the individuals 
from an honor culture (e.g., Turkey) will have a lower level of 
dispositional trust due to norms promoting self-protection. 
H2: Honor culture operators will be less likely to comply with 
high degree of automation (DOA) or low transparency 
automation than Face or Dignity culture operators and will 
require greater support than Dignity and Face cultures because 
of their self-protective stance. 
H3: Lack of transparency will lower ratings of trust of operators 
from all cultures due to weakening of evidence about system 
operation and performance. 
H4: Face culture (e.g., Taiwan) operators will exhibit 
automation bias by accepting recommendations from 
automation even if their basis is not well understood due to their 
authoritative source, while Dignity and Honor culture operators 
will be less likely to trust or accept recommendations on this 
basis.  
III. TRANSPARENCY, TRUST, AND DEGREE OF 
AUTOMATION  
Beck et al. [8] have termed the choice to use and the manner 
in which automation is used the automation usage decision.  An 
operator is presumed to choose to depend on automation under 
circumstances in which she expects to benefit from use and 
reject it otherwise.  Automation transparency refers to the 
extent to which automation provides the information needed for 
a human to make accurate predictions of its behavior in order 
to make this decision.   In conventional closed loop control, 
such as a household thermostat (Fig.1), the state of the system 
(temperature) is sensed, this data is processed (compared to 
temperature setting) and a response is generated (furnace turned 
on or off).  Conventional thermostats make themselves 
transparent by displaying information from all three of these 
stages:  sensed and reference temperatures and indication of 
furnace operation.  One might still use a less transparent, 
opaque thermostat that could only be turned on or off but 
predicting its behavior would now require beliefs about current 
temperature, temperature setting, and how the thermostat 
operates.   Finally, our thermostat could be a less than fully 
automated manual thermostat providing a display for the user 
to compare current and reference temperatures but requiring the 
user to press a button to start the furnace.  
 Fig. 1-Diagram shows control loop. Thermometer measures temperature 
in house which is compared with temperature setting (scales).  If measured 
temperature is less than setting, furnace is turned on and heat indication on 
thermostat illuminated; if below they are turned off.  The furnace affects the 
temperature within the house completing the loop. For the conventional 
thermostat the user can see all parts of the control loop.  For the manual 
thermostat the user can see the temperature and setting but must make the 
comparison and turn the furnace on/off herself.  The opaque thermostat shows 
nothing.  The user must judge by the comfort of the house whether thermostat 
is functioning properly. 
 
In this paper we investigate the relations between 
transparency, trust, degree of automation and dependence on 
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automation.  Because these constructs have historically been 
treated as distinct topics we will review each in turn. 
A. Trust in Automation 
Trust in automation is an attitude, which can act as an 
intervening variable to mediate a human’s decision to use or not 
use available automation [9]–[11]. Increasing the 
appropriateness of dependence on automation is presumed to 
depend on the calibration of this trust [12].  Trust, however, is 
not an exclusive determinant of usage, with other factors such 
as task load [9], [13] frequently found to affect usage 
independent of trust. Even when trust and dependence on 
automation are affected by the same factors, mediation may be 
absent as in the case of alarms  [15] for which rates of 
agreement can be predicted from probability matching without 
reference to trust. We hypothesize that trust will become a 
determinant of dependence primarily in situations where 
information for predicting automation behavior is incomplete.  
Accumulated research suggests that trust in automation is 
affected by system characteristics such as reliability degree of 
automation [16], [17], and transparency [10], [18], while 
individual characteristics such as self confidence in performing 
a task [19] culture [20], and environmental characteristics such 
as task load [21], [22] and risk [22] may affect either trust, 
dependence, or both. 
B. Degree of Automation  
The effects of automation on usage and trust depend jointly 
on what aspects of a task are automated and how they are 
automated.  These distinctions have commonly been organized 
as levels, stages, or degrees of automation. The oldest of these, 
Levels of Automation (LOA) [19], focuses on locus of control 
(human 1-5, or automation 7-10) and proceeds from aspects of 
the task involving information to those dealing with actions.   A 
revision of this taxonomy, Stages of Automation [20], 
emphasized the progression from information to action by 
postulating four stages of automation: information acquisition, 
information analysis, decision selection, and action 
implementation.   Guidance based on this model [12], [23], 
[24], later termed degree of automation (DOA), favors higher 
degrees of automation at early stages and lower degrees of 
automation at later ones.  Fig. 2 shows automation profiles for 
transparency of these stages [23] for the thermostats in Fig. 1 
illustrating the “end-to-end” principle.  The conventional 
thermostat, A, with transparency at each of the involved stages 
is fully transparent making its behavior completely predictable 
(furnace off above setpoint and on below setpoint).   The 
manual thermostat, B, is also fully transparent through the 
information analysis stage where it ends because user can see 
both the current temperature and the setpoint providing all the 
information needed for the choice to turn the furnace on or off. 
For the opaque thermostat, C, automation behavior cannot be 
predicted directly because the stages preceding the action are 
unobservable. Instead, the decision to use or not use the opaque 
thermostat must rely on beliefs about what it will do, i.e. trust.  
Because later stages of automation often presuppose 
automation at earlier stages without requiring them to be 
observed, later stage automation is typically more opaque as 
pointed out by [24] and illustrated in our thermostat example.  
Earlier stages are likewise more likely to be fully transparent 
because there are few or no prior stages to be made transparent. 
For later stage automation the operator may lack the ability 
to perform the task independently, as well, and thus be less able 
to predict or evaluate the system’s performance [24].  Research 
on the effects of automation failures finds a similar tradeoff 
with operator workload lowered by automation but situation 
  Fig. 2. Transparency profiles based on Parasuraman, Wickens, and 
Sheridan (2000) automation stages-conventional thermostat A is observable at 
each stage of automation, manual thermostat B is observable at the two stages 
it includes, opaque thermostat C is only observable at the fourth stage through 
furnace being on or off.   
 
awareness (SA) and recovery from failures significantly 
degraded by high degrees of automation.  This leads to 
recommendations for choosing medium levels of automation 
[25], [26]  in order to benefit from lowered workload while 
maintaining sufficient SA to manage failures.   
A smaller number of studies have measured the effects of 
DOA on trust.  [16] found ratings of trust higher in a condition 
prioritizing a list of possible engagements than in either an 
unprioritized list or higher levels of automation. [27] similarly 
found a lower level of automation preferred for aiding an air 
traffic control (ATC) task. [26]  report higher ratings of trust for 
management by consent (lower LOA) than for management by 
exception (higher LOA) as well.   A related finding by [17] 
showed that making results of automation at the information 
analysis stage observable in addition to an automated action 
served to increase trust.  While limited, these results suggest 
that the effects of DOA on trust parallel those on performance 
with lower levels/earlier stages of automation inducing greater 
trust and higher usage than higher DOAs  
C. Transparency 
Transparency can occur at any stage of automation but may 
be most effective when preceding stages are transparent as well.  
Despite this, many transparency manipulations have targeted 
performance at the execution stage alone.   Attributes such as 
system reliability are often assumed to be directly observable to 
users yet may be perceived inaccurately. [21], for example, 
found trust and dependence to be influenced by cover stories.   
Other studies [8] have found supplying knowledge of results to 
lead to better trust calibration and improved dependence.  
Annotating decisions with confidence judgments is another 
widely used technique for providing greater insight into system 
performance.  This has been done variously by providing 
probabilities of success [10], [28], confidence in detection [28]  
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or confidence (Q values) in selected robot actions [11].   
Transparency at the situation assessment stage provides 
teleological (why) explanations which may be incomplete, 
simply conveying relevant features contributing to an 
automation decision [29] or supplying the logic behind the 
decision [30] as well.  Teleological explanations are both 
preferred by humans [31]  and conform to our premise that end-
to-end transparency will lead to fuller prediction and more 
accurate decisions.  Transparency of purpose, by contrast, is 
usually informally conveyed through instructions or the 
demand characteristics of an experiment, however, when 
explicitly manipulated in [17], effects on trust and dependence 
were found.   
D. Synthesizing Trust, DOA, and Transparency  
Trust, DOA, and transparency can be related in a unified 
framework in which use of automation is treated as a rational 
decision based on a human’s expectation of benefiting from the 
automation’s predicted behavior.  When there is no uncertainty 
(automation is fully transparent) this decision can be based 
entirely on observation.  Where uncertainty exists trust 
contributes to the automation usage decision.  Automation 
transparency can affect the decision to use both directly and 
indirectly through its effects on learned trust.  
The experiment compares experimental conditions that:  
1. automate and display information from the 
information analysis stage (full transparency)-HL 
highlight condition in experiment  
2. automate the action stage without information from 
the earlier stages on which it is based (opaque)- PR 
path-replan condition in experiment 
3. display information from information analysis stage 
and automate action (full transparency).  PRHL- 
path-replan and highlight condition from experiment. 
We hypothesize that: 
TH 1   trust will be rated higher for the transparent      
           conditions and participants will comply with the 
           transparent response of condition 3 at a higher rate 
           than the opaque one of condition 2. 
TH 2   In the presence of uncertainty about automation 
           behavior in condition 2, we hypothesize that trust 
           will play a role in automation dependence. 
TH 3   For transparent condition-3 we hypothesize a 
           lessened role for trust than condition-2 along with a 
           higher rate of dependence. 
IV. EXPERIMENT 
This paper reports on the navigation task from a dual task 
study conducted in the U.S., Taiwan, and Turkey.  The study 
was conducted in the context of a larger research project in 
which a cross-cultural measure of trust was developed. Data 
from this study provided both a basis for investigating cross-
cultural effects of trust in automation and for convergent and 
predictive validation of the trust measure. 
The experimental simulation was developed by modifying an 
existing multi-UAV simulation, RESCHU [32] (see Fig. 3), by 
adding a likelihood display for the payload task and adding 
Dubins path dynamics to the navigation task.  Five UAVs were 
routed between sequences of potential targets.  Operators 
performed two tasks: identifying and attacking hostile targets 
(payload task), and rerouting the UAVs’ paths to avoid conflicts 
(navigation task). RESCHU provided a payload window 
(shown at the top left in Fig. 3) for target detection tasks and a 
map display (shown in the right window in Fig. 3) for UAV 
navigation tasks.  
An autonomous path planner was used to generate visible 
UAV paths following a shortest-distance criterion. Because 
UAVs were independently assigned to new targets, conflicting 
paths risking collision could arise.  In addition, the navigation 
task required monitoring UAV paths to avoid passing through 
hazard areas (shown as yellow regions in Fig. 4b) which 
appeared at random intervals and locations.  When a UAV 
confronts a risk, such as conflicting paths or entering a hazard 
area, the operator must reroute the UAV by adding waypoints 
to avoid collisions and maneuver around threats.  To add 
realistic complexity to rerouting, UAVs diverted by the path 
planner followed Dubins paths [33] which enforce a turning 
radius similar to the behavior of fixed wing air craft.  A Dubins 
path is the shortest path that connects two points in 
the Euclidean plane with a constraint on curvature and results 
in path segments that are either of maximum curvature or 
straight.  Such irregular paths are more difficult for users to 
understand and predict strengthening the roles trust and 
transparency might play in their dependence decisions. 
A. Automated Assistance 
A conflict detector predicted conflicts between UAV paths 
or paths and hazards when the area of risk came within a 
prescribed range of a UAV.   To aid the operator this area was 
highlighted to indicate the risk, a path which would avoid the 
risk was generated, or both were provided.  The conflict 
detector was 90% reliable generating erroneous alerts, 10% of 
the time, while the path planner was completely reliable. This 
equated the automation conditions for reliability, as errors in all 
three arose solely from the conflict detector.   Vehicle to 
Vehicle (V-V) and Vehicle to Hazard (V-H) damages were 
assessed as a sum of the durations a vehicle spent in dangerous 
proximity to other vehicles or within a hazard region.   
To alert the operator to an impending risk detected by the 
conflict detector, the highlight aid placed a red square on the 
map (Fig. 4a) in the region in which minimum separation was 
predicted to be violated or added red dots (Fig. 4b) at the points 
at which the UAV was expected to enter and exit a hazard area.  
The operator then needed to manually add waypoints to divert 
the UAV around the risk. In automated response conditions 
path planning was initiated when a risk was detected by the 
conflict detector.  The Path Planner generated an additional 
waypoint defining a path that would avoid the risk and 
undimmed the UAV’s ‘AUTO’ button making it available for 
use.  The user could then either accept the unseen path by 
clicking ‘AUTO’, supply a waypoint manually, or do nothing 
(Fig. 5).  If the new plan is selected the UAV will avoid the risk 
but incur additional costs in traveling distance and time 
providing an incentive for rejecting false alarms.  In the 
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Fig. 3. The RESCHU user interface. The map window shows the numbered 
UAVs (blue ovals) with paths to targets (red diamonds); threat areas are marked 
by the yellow circles. 
 
 (4a) Adding waypoints to avoid path conflicts 
 
  (4b) Adding waypoints to avoid threat areas 
Fig. 4. Adding UAV’s waypoints to avoid collisions. 
 
Fig. 5. By clicking the auto button, new paths are applied to divert the 
UAVs from the collision course. 
Highlight + Planner condition both highlighting of risks and 
the option of selecting an automated plan are available.  
B. Universal Trust in Automation Measure 
As part of this research we have developed a measure of trust 
in automation, Universal Trust in Automation (UTA), that has  
been validated across large samples in three diverse cultures: 
United States, Taiwan, and Turkey representatives of dignity, 
face, and honor cultures respectively [5]. Following standard 
test development methods, a psychometric measure with three 
dominant dimensions  was developed.  Upon examination of 
items these dimensions were found to correspond roughly  to 
the performance, purpose, and process dimensions 
hypothesized by [12].  One distinct 9 item scale corresponds to 
the dispositional and situational sources of variation 
hypothesized by [9] while the second 9 item scale measures 
trust as learned through experience with the system.  Scales, 
data, and analyses are archived  at OpenICPSR [34].  Reported 
full scale scores are an average of their dimensional subscales. 
C. Experimental Conditions 
Degree of automation (DOA), trust, and transparency are 
major factors known to affect the decision to use automation.   
To investigate these effects, the present experiment 
manipulated reliability of the payload task (reported in [35]) 
and taskload and DOA/transparency of the (reported here) 
navigation task. The tasks can safely be analyzed 
independently because all interactions between the payload 
task (two levels of reliability) with navigation measures: trust 
in Conflict Detector (F2,504=.572, p = .565, η2=.002), vehicle-
to-vehicle damages (F3,672=.222, p = .881, η2=.001), vehicle-
to-hazard damages (F3,672=.516, p =.672, η2=.002), and 
compliance (F1,336=.768, p = .382, η2=.002) were found non- 
significant.   
DOA and transparency were manipulated in four 
experimental conditions: a monitoring control condition 
without conflict detection (Cntl) and three aided conditions 
replicating the automation profiles of the thermostats in the 
introduction: Highlight (HL) in which potential V-V and V-H 
conflicts were highlighted (manual thermostat), Path Replanner 
(PR) in which rerouting waypoints were proposed to avoid 
vehicle to vehicle conflicts (opaque thermostat), and Highlight 
+ Planner (PRHL) in which conflict detection led to both 
highlighting and a rerouting proposal (conventional 
thermostat). Data were collected from the U.S., Taiwan, and 
Turkey, countries selected to provide representatives of the 
three cultural syndromes, US- Dignity, Taiwan-Face and 
Turkey-Honor. The navigation task followed a mixed repeated-
measures design, with countries (U.S., Taiwan, and Turkey) 
and information transparency/DOA (control, PR, HL, PRHL) 
as the between-subject factors; and counterbalanced taskload as 
the within-participant variable. Task load was manipulated 
through changes to the UAVs’ moving speed, in which the 
vehicles moved at 5.0 pixels/second in the high taskload (HW) 
condition and 2.5 pixels/second in the low taskload (LW) 
condition. 
D. Participants and Procedure 
120 student participants were recruited from each of the three 
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countries. American participants were recruited from the 
University of Pittsburgh (80 females and 40 males with average 
age of 19.57, SD=2.37), Taiwanese participants were recruited 
from National Chengchi University (80 females and 40 males 
with average age of 21.60, SD=2.49), and Turkish participants 
were recruited from Özyeğin University (95 females and 25 
males with average age of 21.58, SD=1.63).  None had prior 
experience with air traffic control although most were frequent 
computer users, where in a typical week American participants 
spend 25.25 (SD=12.19) hours, Taiwanese participants spend 
30.50 (SD=14.72) hours, and Turkish participants spend 17.67 
(SD=11.50) hours using a computer.   
After providing demographic data, participants were asked to 
rate their trust in automation using the dispositional scale of the 
UTA trust instrument. Chinese and Turkish translations of the 
instruments were used in their respective countries.  
Participants were randomly assigned to a display condition and 
received a 20-minute interactive training tutorial. Participants 
were informed that conflict detection was highly (but not 
perfectly) reliable. Their goal was to avoid UAV path conflicts 
and threat areas by adding or moving waypoints using a mouse 
(navigation task), while identifying and attacking as many 
enemy targets as possible (payload task).  After training, 
participants began the first 10-minute experimental session 
followed by completing the NASA-TLX [36] and the UTA trust 
questionnaire [34]  After a brief break, the other taskload 
condition was run accompanied by workload and trust 
measures.  
V. RESULTS 
 Data were analyzed using a mixed-model ANOVA with 
DOA/transparency (control, PR, HL, PRHL) and countries 
(U.S., Taiwan, and Turkey) as the between-subject factors, and 
taskload (high vs. low) as the within-subject variable. 
A. Dispositional Trust 
All three countries differed in their predisposition to trust 
(F2,357=16.225, p < .001). T-tests revealed significant 
differences between the U.S. and Turkey (p < .001), U.S. and 
Taiwan (p = .007), and Taiwan and Turkey (p = .003). The U.S. 
participants had the highest score in dispositional trust and the 
Turkish participants had the lowest, with the Taiwanese rates 
falling in between (Fig. 6). 
The analyses also revealed significant cultural effects on 
subscales for performance (F2,357=2.969, p = .053), process 
(F2,357=66.225, p < .001), and task context (F2,357=18.697, p < 
.001).  Taiwanese rates were higher than Turkey and marginally 
 
Fig. 6. Dispositional trust in automation among three cultures. 
 
higher than US in performance (TW>US, p = .066; TW>TK, p 
= .022)— but lowest for task context (US>TW, p < .001; 
TK>TW, p = .002). 
B. Learned Trust 
An ANOVA revealed a main effect for country 
(F2,522=12.986, p < .001) and DOA/transparency (F2,522=18.100, 
p < .001) on trust; however, no statistical difference was 
observed between taskload conditions. The U.S. and Taiwanese 
participants reached similar overall trust ratings, and were 
significantly higher than Turkish participants (US>TK, p = 
.001; TW>TK, p < .001).  
The results (Table I) also found a main effect for 
DOA/transparency in the overall trust ratings (F1,708=18.221, p 
< .001) as well as in performance (F1,708=14.018, p < .001), 
process (F1,708=8.674, p < .001), and purpose (F1,708=20.415, p 
< .001) constructs. The highest trust was observed in the HL 
condition and the lowest score was found in the PR condition, 
with PRHL in the middle. T-tests showed that both HL and 
PRHL were significantly higher than the PR condition across 
all the comparisons, confirming TH 1, trust will be rated higher 
in transparent conditions. Although little difference was  
 
TABLE I   
TRUST IN DOA/TRANSPARENCY CONDITIONS 
Measures F1,708 p-value Post hoc 
Performance 13.699< .001 
HL>PR (p < .001) 
PRHL>PR (p < .001)
HL≈PRHL (p = .318)
Process 8.759 < .001 
HL>PR (p < .001) 
PRHL>PR (p = .002)
HL≈PRHL (p = .336)
Purpose 20.431< .001 
HL>PR (p < .001) 
PRHL>PR (p = .001)
HL>PRHL (p = .002)
Overall 
 (average value)18.100< .001 
HL>PR (p < .001) 
PRHL>PR (p < .001)
HL>PRHL (p = .049)
 
observed between the HL and PRHL conditions in performance 
and process constructs, the effects were especially prominent in 
the purpose construct (HL>PRHL, p = .002), which resulted in 
significant differences in the overall comparison between the 
HL and PRHL aids (p = .049). 
C. Transparency and Culture 
Further analysis revealed significant cultural differences 
between the U.S. and Turkey as well as Taiwan and Turkey in 
both the PR (p = .023 and p = .001 respectively) and PRHL 
conditions (p = .001 and p < .001 respectively). While ratings 
of trust were consistently higher in the U.S. and Taiwanese 
population than the Turkish group, no statistical difference was 
found in the HL condition among the three cultural groups.  US 
and Taiwanese participants reported similar levels of trust in 
HL and PRHL conditions that were considerably higher than 
those of Turkish participants (HL p < .02, PRHL p < .001).  
Notably, Turkish ratings for trust in PRHL where the system 
offered to replan as well as highlight the conflict were 
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significantly lower (p = .001) than in the HL condition.  While 
all groups expressed greater trust in the highlight conditions 
than in the planner alone (p < .001), Turkish participants 
declined to trust the planner even when its actions could be 
verified through highlighting (PRHL). 
D. Vehicle-Vehicle and Vehicle-Hazard Damages 
 Preventing UAV path conflicts and avoiding threat areas to 
prevent damage were primary objectives of the navigation task.  
The ANOVA for vehicle-vehicle (V-V) damage (i.e., path 
conflicts), shown in Fig. 7, found a main effect for taskload 
(F1,696=8.367, p = .004), DOA/transparency (F3,696=16.077, p < 
.001), cultural variables (F2,696=13.251, p < .001), and an 
interaction between taskload and DOA/transparency 
(F3,696=3.244, p = .022). The results showed that increasing task 
load led to higher levels of V-V damage. The lowest V-V 
damage was found in the PRHL condition and the highest was 
found in the control monitoring condition, with no difference 
between the PR and the HL groups. Post hoc analysis found 
higher levels of V-V damage for Turkish participants than 
American (p < .001) or Taiwanese participants (p < .001), with 
no difference found between American and Taiwanese 
participants. 
 
 
Fig. 7 Vehicle-to-vehicle damage between conditions. 
To better measure the effects of cultural factors, data were 
compared for country and condition. While no difference was 
observed for the PRHL condition, the analysis showed 
significant cultural differences for control (monitoring) 
(F2,177=3.031, p = .05), PR (F2,177=6.860, p = .001), and HL 
(F2,177=4.821, p = .009) conditions, in which significantly 
higher damage was found for Turkish operators than American 
or Taiwanese participants.  
The related measure of vehicle-hazard (V-H) damage (i.e., 
threat areas), shown in Fig. 8, revealed significant differences 
in taskload (F1,696=21.371, p < .001), DOA/transparency 
(F3,696=75.721, p < .001), and country (F2,696=5.770, p = .003). 
Significant differences were also found for the interaction 
between taskload and DOA/transparency (F3,696=196.673, p < 
.001), Fig. 8. Higher V-H damage was found in LW than HW 
conditions. The lowest V-H damage was found in the control 
condition while the highest damages were found in the HL 
condition, with higher damage in the PRHL condition than in 
the PR condition. Further analysis showed that cultural effects 
on V-H damage were only observed for the PR condition 
between American and Turkish participants (p = .05), while the 
rest of the comparisons remained nonsignificant. 
 
 Fig. 8.  Vehicle to hazard damage between conditions 
E.  Compliance 
An operator’s compliance in navigation tasks was 
determined by the ratio of accepted paths to all paths proposed 
by the conflict detector. Therefore, the analysis only includes 
PR and PRHL conditions (Fig. 9). Compliance rates ranged 
from 79% for Taiwanese participants in the PRHL condition to 
22% for Turkish participants in the PR condition.  Although a 
strategy of accepting all recommendations would have 
eliminated V-V damage at the cost of a small number of 
unnecessary reroutings it was not adopted by any of the groups. 
The results showed a main effect of taskload (F1,348=4.558, p = 
.033), DOA/transparency (F1,348=32.068, p < .001), and country 
(F2,348=5.298, p = .005), in which higher compliance was 
observed in the HW conditions as well as in the PRHL 
condition, confirming TH 1, participants will comply with 
transparent automation at higher rates. Post-hoc analysis 
showed that the Taiwanese participants had the highest 
compliance with the automated recommendations (TW>US, p 
= .030; TW>TK, p = .002), but no difference was observed 
between the U.S. and the Turkish participants.  
 Fig. 9. Compliance- accepted waypoints 
    Further analysis showed a cultural effect in the PR condition 
(F2,174=7.924, p = .001) but not on the PRHL condition, in 
which the Taiwanese participants accepted significantly more 
proposed new paths in the PR condition than the U.S. partici- 
pants (p = .010) or the Turkish participants (p < .001).  In 
addition, the number of manual waypoints revealed that 
American participants added significantly more waypoints (did 
not comply) than TW (p = .036) participants in PR condition, 
and issued a higher number of manual waypoints than TW (p = 
.003) as well as TK (p < .001) participants in the PRHL 
condition. 
    The results (Table II) showed significant correlation with 
trust in the PR condition where operators could not observe 
the basis for the automation’s decision, but not in the PRHL 
condition where the conflict being avoided was marked 
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TABLE II 
CORRELATIONS BETWEEN TRUST AND COMPLIANCE WITH PLANNER 
Number of Accepted Automated Waypoints in Conflict 
Detector (Compliance) 
Path Re-plan (PR) 
Pearson 
correlation .300** 
Sig. Difference .000 
Path Re-plan + Highlight 
(PRHL) 
Pearson 
correlation .092 
Sig. Difference .218 
 
TABLE III 
 CORRELATIONS BETWEEN TRUST AND COMPLIANCE  BY CULTURE 
Correlation Results Path Planner 
Trust 
US group 
Pearson Correlation .274* 
Sig. (2-tailed) .034 
Trust  
TW group 
Pearson Correlation .171 
Sig. (2-tailed) .193 
Trust  
TK group 
Pearson Correlation .442** 
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 
 
allowing operators to base their decision on their observations 
as well as trust in automation.  These observations confirm TH 
2, trust will contribute to dependence under uncertainty and TH 
3, the role of trust in determining dependence will decrease with 
decrease in uncertainty.  As shown in Table III, trust was a 
strong determinant of PR use in the Turkish sample and a 
moderate influence on US participants, but had no effect within 
the Taiwanese group. 
VI. DISCUSSION 
A. Relation Between Trust and Automation Dependence 
In this experiment, trust in automation appears to have served 
as an effective intervening variable only for the opaque high 
DOA PR condition as predicted by the unified framework.  Its 
effects on compliance also varied widely across cultures 
accounting for approximately 20% of variance in the Turkish 
sample, 7% in the US, and none in the Taiwanese.  Compliance 
with the path planner (PR condition) where little other 
information was available was correlated with trust (r= .30) and 
paths were accepted only an average of 5.47 times in the US 
and Turkish groups. Trust became uncorrelated when 
highlighting of conflicts was added, yet compliance more than 
doubled to 13.18 accepted paths, confirming TH 3, dependence 
will increase with increasing transparency.  In this case the 
decision to rely on the conflict detector in the PR condition 
where situation assessment information was unavailable was 
influenced by trust but when operators were allowed to “see for 
themselves” (HL and PRHL conditions) trust, although higher, 
was no longer a necessary basis for usage.   Taiwanese 
participants, by contrast, relied an average of 11.25 times in the 
opaque PR condition only slightly below their average of 14.67 
paths in the PRHL condition.  They, however, trusted more in 
the PRHL condition with ratings in the two conditions (PR and 
PRHL) comparable to those of the American sample.  Only the 
Turkish sample differentiated trust between the HL and PRHL 
conditions indicating a minor effect of DOA not resolved by 
transparency at earlier stages of automation.  This difference, 
however, was dwarfed by those found between the PR and 
PRHL conditions.  These results support the framework’s 
premises of the importance of end-to-end transparency (HL, 
PRHL) for automation dependence and the relation between 
automation uncertainty and the role of trust.   
B. Transparency and Stages of Automation 
Transparency at earlier (SA) stages provides evidence of the 
‘cause’ of subsequent automated or manual actions.    
Transparency at the decision and action stage, by contrast, 
provides only increased precision about outcomes such as more 
accurate knowledge of results or confidence ratings. Lombrozo 
[31] argues that  humanly intelligible “explanations typically 
appeal to causes…  When explanations are judged for quality 
the presence of a general pattern is typically preferred to 
probability judgements alone.”  Extended to transparency this 
human preference for teleology should favor choosing 
transparency at the situation assessment stage where the 
conditions initiating the automation’s actions are observed over 
transparency at the decision and action stage where only results 
can be viewed in greater detail.  Participants in the PR 
condition, for example, had clear knowledge of results from 
observing the conflict avoiding trajectories of the planner and 
the effects of these actions on the display of running damage 
providing transparency of performance and evidence of high 
reliability. They were, however deterred from use, due to 
uncertainty over why they were being asked to allow the 
automation to replan paths.  When that reassurance was 
supplied through highlighting, usage tripled within the Turkish 
sample.  Ideally as in [10] and the present study, transparency 
can be increased across all stages 
C. Culture 
Participants responded to manipulations broadly as expected 
across the three cultures.  Cultural differences for 
DOA/transparency were found on all four dependent measures.  
The performance of U.S. and Taiwanese participants was 
frequently very similar while both differed strongly from the 
Turkish group.  The exception was in response to the opaque 
PR (path replan) condition in which Taiwanese participants 
complied with requests at a much higher rate than did their 
Turkish or American counterparts.   
Our cultural predictions, based primarily on the theory of 
Cultural Syndromes, were confirmed.  As hypothesized (H1), 
dignity culture participants (US) had a higher level of 
dispositional trust whereas those from the honor culture 
(Turkey) had a lower level of dispositional trust. Participants 
from the face culture Taiwan) who were not predicted to be 
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either high or low fell in between. 
The path re-plan (PR) condition which automated decision 
and action (DOA) and lacked transparency (did not convey 
logic of action), had the lowest trust scores confirming H3, Lack 
of transparency will lower ratings of trust of operators from all 
cultures and also led to lower compliance for US and TK 
participants (H4).  The highlight (HL) aid, which highlighted 
possible collisions and hazard violations on the map supporting 
SA   but requiring operators to manually add waypoints, was 
rated highest in trust.  The higher DOA integrated aid which 
supplied automated path re-planning along with highlighting 
(PRHL) had an intermediate level of rated trust (due to lower 
Turkish ratings) but led to substantially higher levels of 
compliance than either of the other aids.   
The shared control within the HL condition was especially 
beneficial to Turkish participants because honor cultures start 
with lower levels of trust and may require greater exposure to 
develop it.  While the American and Taiwanese participants had 
similar levels of trust in the PR and PRHL conditions, which 
were higher than those of the Turkish participants, no difference 
was observed in the HL conditions across the three cultures.   
These findings confirm: H2 Honor culture operators will be 
less likely to trust high DOA automation than Face or Dignity 
culture operators.   
A higher rate of compliance with the conflict det ctor (i.e., 
accepted more proposed new paths) was observed in the PRHL, 
than in the PR condition. Results show that the American and 
Turkish participants had both lower trust (H3) and were less 
likely to comply with automation when situation assessment 
was unavailable (H4).  Taiwanese PR operators also had lower 
trust scores similar to the Americans however, they continued 
to rely on opaque automation at a high rate confirming H4. Face 
culture operators will exhibit automation bias by accepting 
recommendations from automation even if their basis is not well 
understood due to their authoritative source, while Dignity and 
Honor culture operators will be less likely to trust or accept 
recommendations on this basis.  
 
D. Counterintuitive V-H Damage Results 
The hypotheses about the interrelated effects of trust, 
transparency, and DOA were confirmed except for those 
involving Vehicle-to-Hazard damage which had been predicted 
to mirror V-V damages.  
 
1) V-H Damage Favoring Non Highlight Conditions 
We believe that these counterintuitive findings of higher V-
H damage under highlighting conditions (HL, PRHL) and under 
low taskload resulted from interrelated causes: Ineffectiveness 
of highlighting of hazard conflicts (HL, PRHL conditions), 
Greater unaided conspicuity of hazard conflicts than vehicle 
conflicts (Cntl, PR conditions), Asymmetric allocation of 
resources, Competition for attention between multiple conflicts. 
Hazard violations were indicated in HL and PRHL 
conditions by difficult to discern dots at points of projected 
entry and exit of the hazard region as shown in Figure 3b.  We 
believe this enhancement was ineffective in attracting attention 
beyond that already provided by the view of the projected path 
crossing the hazard area.  As a consequence, the conspicuity of 
V-H conflicts was effectively the same across the four 
conditions.  The comparison between conditions therefore 
involves differences in the display of V-V conflicts and how 
they influenced responses to V-H conflicts.  In HL and PRHL 
both the V-V and V-H conflicts are perceptually salient so 
participants can scan the display to identify the conflict.  In the 
Cntl and PR conditions the V-H conflicts remain perceptually 
salient but V-V conflicts require estimating velocities of the 
involved vehicles and deciding whether or not they will come 
too close in the vicinity where their projected paths cross.  As a 
consequence, Cntl and PR operators for which V-H is the only 
perceptually salient conflict resolve V-H conflicts rapidly 
accumulating minimal damage, while performance on the 
estimation based V-V conflicts is much poorer. For HL and 
PRHL operators both conflicts are perceptually salient leading 
to potential competitions in which V-H conflicts are neglected 
while more damaging V-V ones are resolved.  
 
2) Task Load 
Increasing task load demanded more cognitive resources and 
required the operators to allocate more attention to the 
navigation task. Despite frequent findings of reduced trust 
under higher task loads [16] [21] no effects were observed in 
the present study, a finding also reported by [22].  There were, 
however, effects of increased use of automation, often observed 
when operators must use automation to keep up with task 
demands [16][21].  Increased load also led to increases in V-V 
damage.  V-H damage, however, was higher in LW, an effect 
we attribute to the lower rates of compliance and hence 
increased manual maneuvering for low task load in the aided 
conditions. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
In this study effects of transparency were strongly influenced 
by culture suggesting that designs and training developed for 
Western (dignity) cultures may require modification and 
adjustment for use elsewhere.    The distrust leading to disuse 
found for the Turkish (honor culture) sample suggests that in 
transitioning automation technologies to honor cultures it may 
be important to provide extra mechanisms, such as increased 
transparency, to foster usage.  Other features such as providing 
reassurance through redundant manual controls and extended 
training periods may be necessary to overcome initial higher 
levels of distrust.  It might be unwise, for example, to introduce 
driverless cars without a steering wheel, something being 
planned by two prominent US driverless car firms [37],  into 
honor cultures.  The Taiwanese (face culture) showed the 
opposite tendency toward automation bias in relying on 
automation in the PR condition even under conditions of 
reduced trust.   
While developed for anthropology the fruitfulness of the 
theory of Cultural Syndromes for study of human-machine 
systems was apparent from this study.  It readily generated 
hypotheses, later confirmed, about cultural differences in trust 
and compliance with automation. Although this study was 
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restricted to highly reliable, miss-free automation it is easy to 
imagine how cultural syndromes might be used to generate 
hypotheses about automation usage decisions of unreliable 
automation conditions as well as in other areas of human-
machine studies.  
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General	Trust	Scale		
(administered	before	use)	
Dimension	 Survey	Items	 Disagree	strongly	 Disagree	
Neither	
agree	nor	
disagree	
Agree	 Agree	strongly	
General	
Automation	
Performance	
Expectancy	
Using a decision aid will 
increase my effectiveness on my 
jobs. 
1  2  3  4  5 
Using  decision aids will 
improve my output quality. 1  2  3  4  5 
Using a decision aid will 
increase my chances of 
achieving a higher level of 
performance. 
1  2  3  4  5 
General	
Automation	
Process	
Transparency	
The information that a decision 
aid provides is of high quality. 1  2  3  4  5 
A decision aid provides 
sufficient information. 1  2  3  4  5 
I am satisfied with the 
information that a decision aid 
provides. 
1  2  3  4  5 
General	
Automation	
Cultural‐
Technological		
Context		
I prefer to use a decision aid to 
make decisions under high 
workload situations. 
1  2  3  4  5 
Using a decision aid helps me to 
expend less effort to accomplish 
tasks. 
1  2  3  4  5 
Using a decision aid helps me 
accomplish tasks with lower 
risk. 
1  2  3  4  5 
Specific	Trust	Scale	
(administered following use) 
Specific	
Automation	
Performance	
Expectancy	
The conflict detector improves 
my performance. 1  2  3  4  5 
The conflict detector enables 
me to accomplish tasks more 
quickly. 
1  2  3  4  5 
The conflict detector increases 
my productivity. 1  2  3  4  5 
Specific	
Automation	
Process	
Transparency	
My interaction with the conflict 
detector  is clearly 
understandable. 
1  2  3  4  5 
The conflict detector is user-
friendly. 1  2  3  4  5 
The conflict detector uses 
appropriate methods to reach 
decisions. 
1  2  3  4  5 
Specific	
Automation	
Purpose	
Influence	
I am confident about the 
performance of the conflict 
detector. 
1  2  3  4  5 
When an emergent issue or 
problem arises, I would feel 
comfortable depending on the 
information provided the 
conflict detector. 
1  2  3  4  5 
I can always rely on the conflict 
detector to ensure my 
performance. 
1  2  3  4  5 
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